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Abstract 
Healthy individuals often exhibit prioritized processing of aversive information, as 
manifested in enhanced orientation of attention to threatening stimuli compared with 
neutral items. In contrast to this adaptive behavior, anxious, fearful, and phobic 
individuals show exaggerated attention biases to threat. In addition, they overestimate the 
likelihood of encountering their feared stimulus and the severity of the consequences; 
both are examples of expectancy biases. The co-occurrence of attention and expectancy 
biases in fear and anxiety proposes causal influences. Herein, we summarize findings 
related to expectancy biases in fear and anxiety, and their association with other 
processing biases, focusing on the link with attention biases. We suggest that evidence 
calls for more comprehensive research strategies in the investigation of mutual influences 
between expectancy and attention biases, as well as their combined effects on fear and 
anxiety. Moreover, both types of bias need to be related to other types of distorted 
information processing commonly observed in fear and anxiety (e.g., memory and 
interpretation biases). Finally, we propose new research directions that may be worth 
considering in developing more effective treatments for anxiety disorders. 
Keywords: fear, phobia, anxiety, threat, expectancy bias, attention bias, combined 
bias hypothesis 
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Expectancy Biases in Fear and Anxiety and Their Link to Biases in Attention 
Fear is an essential emotion for survival because it ensures adaptive reactions in 
dangerous situations (e.g., Bradley & Lang, 2007; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). Yet, despite 
the existential importance of sensitivity to threat, for some people, fear (and its more 
chronic and less stimulus-oriented form, anxiety) can also lead to overprotective 
responses such as the complete avoidance of situations associated with the feared threat. 
Such maladaptive behavior may originate in deviated information processing, making 
those individuals experience the situation as more dangerous than it actually is (for 
examples of cognitive theories elaborating such ideas, see Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 
1985; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; J. M. G. Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1997).  
Fear and phobia are characterized by robust and consistent expectancy biases. 
Highly fearful and phobic individuals exhibit higher expectancies of encountering threat 
(Aue & Hoeppli, 2012; de Jong & Muris, 2002), as well as higher expectancies that such 
encounters will have aversive consequences (Amrhein, Pauli, Dengler, & Wiedemann, 
2005; Kennedy, Rapee, & Mazurski, 1997; Mühlberger, Wiedemann, Herrmann, & Pauli, 
2006). Whereas other kinds of cognitive distortions in anxiety have been more 
extensively studied, biases in expectancies, to date, have rarely been systematically 
examined and are therefore in the focus of the present article.  
In addition to distorted expectations, anxious and phobic individuals exhibit other 
cognitive biases. For instance, there is evidence of diverse attention biases toward threat, 
especially among anxious and fearful or phobic individuals (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendorn, 2007). Of note, recent work postulates a 
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causal role for attention biases in the development of anxiety, similarly to its proposed 
role in depression (e.g., Harmer, Goodwin, & Cowen, 2009; Watters & Williams, 2011), 
a psychopathology that is simultaneously characterized by dysfunctional expectations.  
Investigating potential links between the less investigated expectancy biases and 
the more prominent attention biases is compelling. Yet, to date, research focusing on both 
healthy and pathological forms of fear has overlooked possible relations between 
expectancy and attention biases (and other types of cognitive biases, including biases in 
memory and interpretation). Considering the comorbid appearance of these biases in fear 
and anxiety, it is plausible to hypothesize common underlying mechanisms (for related 
ideas, c.f. Mathews, Mackintosh, & Fulcher, 1997; J. M. G. Williams et al., 1997). 
Notably, most cognitive models of psychopathology postulate that information-
processing biases exert influences on one another (e.g., Ingram, 1984; J. M. G. Williams 
et al., 1997).  
Revealing causal relations between maladaptive cognitive processes in anxiety 
may have significant theoretical and clinical implications: From a basic scientific point of 
view, understanding the causal relations of different cognitive biases may shed light on 
the underlying mechanisms in health and disease states. Moreover, therapeutic 
approaches targeting (the) causal mechanism(s) in anxiety may be more effective than 
current treatments. The present review paper, therefore, focuses on deviations in 
expectancies and their causal interplay with altered attentional processes.  
Focusing our review on links of expectancy bias with other biases on those in 
attention has two reasons. First, as we write, attention biases have been extensively 
investigated in fear and phobia but also in healthy controls. Research has shown that 
Processing biases in fear and anxiety  5 
attention biases are important building blocks of fear and anxiety. Therefore, the 
investigation of links between expectancy and attention distortions can revert to an 
important knowledge base. Second, as we will outline later, to date, empirical data 
regarding causal relations between expectancy bias and other cognitive distortions exist 
exclusively with respect to attentional phenomena.  
We first consider the characteristics of expectancy and attention biases and how 
these can be conceptually distinguished from other types of bias that have additionally 
been observed in fear and phobia. Next, we provide short summaries1 of research 
conducted on expectancy and attention biases to fear-evoking stimuli among (a) healthy, 
(b) anxious2, and (c) fearful3 or phobic4 adults (see Salum et al., 2013; Shechner et al., 
2012, for biases in children and adolescents). We differentiate these populations to 
examine possible similarities and differences between healthy and pathological reactivity 
to threat. We then describe theoretical considerations and recent work investigating the 
 
1 This summary is partial, particularly with respect to attention biases that have already been investigated in 
numerous studies (see Yiend, 2010, for a more detailed review). 
2 If not otherwise indicated, the terms “anxious” and “anxiety” in this paper refer to individuals who 
display mostly subclinical fear and apprehension across a variety of situations (generally assessed via 
questionnaires; e.g., the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). 
3 In this paper, the term “fearful” refers to individuals who exhibit extreme fear toward a specific category 
of threat, but who were not clinically diagnosed as phobic. 
4 In contrast, in the context of the present paper, the term “phobic” refers to individuals who were clinically 
diagnosed (e.g., using the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [5th ed., American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013] or the International Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems [10th rev., World Health Organization, 1992] diagnostic criteria). 
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relation between expectancy and attention biases to threat. Finally, we discuss the need to 
add other types of bias (such as memory and interpretation bias) to the investigation of 
expectancy-attention links in fear and phobia. Supplemental consideration of these 
complementary distortions in information processing may help to shed light on the 
concrete mechanisms underlying expectancy-attention links. Our reflections ought to 
inspire future research in the field, thereby helping to uncover mechanisms that establish 
and strengthen nonadaptive symptoms in anxiety disorders. 
Definitions of Expectancy Bias, Attention Bias, and Other Forms of Distorted 
Information Processing 
Expectancy Bias 
It is important to distinguish two different types of biased expectations (Aue & 
Hoeppli, 2012; Foa & Kozak, 1986). Catastrophic thinking in exaggerated fear, phobia, 
and anxiety may result both from overestimating the likelihood of facing an anticipated 
threat source (encounter expectancy bias; referred to as probability by Foa & Kozak, 
1986) and from overestimating the likelihood that such a confrontation with the threat 
source will have severe consequences (consequences expectancy bias; referred to as cost 
by Foa & Kozak, 1986). Although such a distinction may seem trivial, it is critical 
because these two types of expectancy bias should influence different aspects of 
subjective fear. Encounter expectancy bias should refer to the likelihood of the 
occurrence of fear episodes (i.e., the frequency of occurrence). Conversely, consequences 
expectancy bias should refer to fear intensity (see McNally & Heatherton, 1993, 
Experiment 1, for supportive evidence).  
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The surprisingly sparse research on distorted expectations in fear includes 
investigations of so-called expectancy bias and covariation bias. Although at first glance 
these terms seem divergent, they refer to highly similar phenomena. Studies on 
expectancy bias used on-line investigations of expectancies of negative outcomes while 
individuals were presented with certain classes of stimuli, such as snakes and spiders 
(e.g., Amin & Lovibond, 1997; Davey, 1992; Davey, 1995; de Jong, Merckelbach, & 
Arntz, 1995; Diamond, Matchett, & Davey, 1995; Honeybourne, Matchett, & Davey, 
1993).   
Studies on covariation bias, in contrast, assessed illusory correlations between 
certain classes of stimuli and outcomes (such as between spiders or snakes and pain) in 
the absence of external stimulus presentations (e.g., McNally & Heatherton, 1993; 
Tomarken, Mineka, & Cook, 1989). Moreover, the term covariation bias mixes two 
different phenomena, an a priori covariation bias and an a posteriori covariation bias. 
The a priori covariation bias can be considered an off-line expectancy bias (e.g., Davey, 
1992 [preconditioning stage]; McNally & Heatherton, 1993; for an overview, see Davey, 
1995, or Davey & Dixon, 1996). Specifically, a priori covariation bias describes the 
tendency to expect greater aversive consequences from fear- or phobia-relevant stimuli 
than from fear- or phobia-irrelevant stimuli (e.g., greater expectancy to receive an electric 
shock after having viewed spiders than after having viewed flowers) and is generally 
assessed before the onset of an experiment. The a posteriori covariation bias, instead, is 
assessed at the end of an experiment and describes the same association in retrospect, 
namely, that humans have a tendency to overassociate previous events that were related 
to fear-relevant stimuli with past negative experiences (e.g., de Jong & Merckelbach, 
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1991; de Jong, Merckelbach, Arntz, & Nijman, 1992; Pury & Mineka, 1997; Tomarken et 
al., 1989; Tomarken, Sutton, & Mineka, 1995). Consequently, we consider the a 
posteriori covariation bias as a memory bias and will not discuss it in the context of 
expectancy biases (for a meta-analytic review on memory biases, see Mitte, 2008; for a 
review specifically on social phobia, see Hirsch & Clark, 2004). 
As described earlier, the difference between expectancy bias and a priori 
covariation bias refers to the transient presence versus absence of external stimuli that 
individuals associate with negative outcomes. Yet, because studies on covariation bias 
rely on internal representations of the stimuli, the distinction seems minor. An additional 
difference, however, is that covariation bias is often assessed off-line in single-trial 
snapshots before (or after; i.e., memory bias) the experimental manipulations, whereas 
expectancy bias relies more strongly on multiple-trial on-line assessments of expectancies 
in an experiment. In the following, therefore, we use the terms on-line and off-line 
expectancy bias.  
Attention Bias  
These biases comprise (a) early automatic vigilance in the face of threat (Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998), (b) difficulty in disengaging attention from threat (Cisler & Koster, 2010; 
Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Yiend & Mathews, 
2001), and (c) avoidance of threatening information during later, more controlled, stages 
of processing (corresponding to the so-called vigilance-avoidance pattern; see Amir, Foa, 
& Coles, 1998; Mogg, Bradley, DeBono, & Painter, 1997).  
Additional Types of Information Processing Bias  
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Anxiety and fear are characterized by other kinds of processing biases in addition 
to expectancy and attention biases. Because the use of terminology referring to these 
different kinds of distortions generally lacks consistency, the following differentiation of 
some of these terms from expectancy bias relies on our own definitions of these 
phenomena.  
 Memory bias describes the tendency to recall information and past experiences in 
a distorted manner, whereas expectancy bias is directed toward future happenings (see 
distinction between a priori and a posteriori covariation biases earlier). Interpretation 
bias refers to the tendency of an individual to interpret ambiguous situations in either a 
positive or a negative way; these situations usually relate to the present rather than to the 
future. Attribution bias is related to inferences about the causes of human behavior or 
significant happenings and is therefore oriented toward the past. Rather than being 
concerned with such causes, expectancy bias is future oriented (i.e., related to anticipated 
outcomes and their implications for personal well-being). Finally, reasoning bias, belief 
bias, or confirmation bias (also termed motivated reasoning) relates to the fact that we 
sometimes specifically search for evidence supporting our own convictions or weigh 
evidence in a distorted fashion. Such behavior serves the confirmation of existent belief 
systems and reduces cognitive dissonance. Therefore, confirmation bias may rely on the 
activation of related biases in expectancies and attention. Notably, as we outline in 
greater depth later, although we believe it is important to consider the biases as separate 
from each other, evidence suggests that these different types of information-processing 
biases exert mutual influences. 
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Review of Research on Expectancy Bias 
Whether or not we anticipate the possibility of being confronted with a 
threatening situation in the near or far future should have a major impact on our 
experience of fear.5 Despite these considerations, biased expectancies in fear and phobia 
have rarely been systematically investigated and are therefore reviewed in detail here. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the findings for the populations considered. Figure 1 
shows how different types of expectancy bias have been investigated in the research 
reviewed. 
Healthy Individuals 
In studies of off-line expectancy bias toward negative consequences in which 
participants were told that electric shocks would be administered after fear-relevant (e.g., 
dangerous animals such as snakes and spiders) and fear-irrelevant (i.e., nonthreatening 
animals such as cats and pigeons) stimuli, healthy participants initially expected more 
shock administrations after fear-relevant stimuli than after fear-irrelevant stimuli (e.g., 
Diamond et al., 1995; Honeybourne et al., 1993; Kennedy et al., 1997; McNally & 
 
5 In fact, some theories see fear and anxiety as a result of a maladaptive or unfortunate learning history 
(related to classical conditioning, instrumental conditioning, or observational learning; Bandura, 1977; 
Mowrer; 1956, Rachman, 1977), thus producing distorted expectancies that are expressed in 
catastrophizing thoughts. This view comprises the idea that such disadvantageous expectancies can be 
unlearned (see Myers & Davis, 2002, for mechanisms underlying fear extinction), a conviction that is also 
expressed in (cognitive) behavior therapy (Beck, 1976; Butler, Fennell, & Hackmann, 2008), which 
targets these maladaptive expectancies in fear and anxiety by cognitive reframing methods and exposure 
in vivo and/or in sensu. 
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Heatherton, 1993). These initially anticipated contingencies were disconfirmed when 
subsequently no shock was administered at all. As such nonreinforcement of the a priori 
biased expectancies continued, the overestimation of negative consequences of fear-
relevant as compared with fear-irrelevant stimuli (on-line expectancy bias for negative 
consequences) vanished (Amin & Lovibond, 1997; Davey, 1992). Yet, a single pairing of 
a fear-relevant stimulus with an electric shock can reinstate the consequences expectancy 
bias (Davey, 1992). Moreover, biased consequence expectancies have been reported to go 
hand in hand with increased skin conductance response magnitudes at some moments 
during an experiment (e.g., Amin & Lovibond, 1997; Davey, 1992; Diamond et al., 1995; 
Honeybourne et al., 1993). 
Whether observed consequence expectancy biases toward phylogenetic threats 
such as snakes and spiders are more pronounced than are such biases toward ontogenetic 
threats (e.g., weapons and broken outlets) needs to be further investigated. Although there 
is evidence for a stronger expectancy bias for phylogenetic threats (Amin & Lovibond, 
1997), other researchers found no difference between phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
threats (Honeybourne et al., 1993; McNally & Heatherton, 1993).6 
Finally, a study of on-line encounter expectancy bias (Aue & Hoeppli, 2012) 
found no evidence among healthy controls for overestimation of encounters with fear-
relevant animals (spiders and snakes) compared with birds. Notably, however, all 
participants included in this research displayed very low levels of fear of both spiders and 
 
6 This mixed evidence mirrors the results observed in the area of attention bias (supportive evidence for 
priority of phylogenetic threat: e.g., Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; contradictory evidence: e.g., Lipp, 
Derakshan, Waters, & Logies, 2004; Tipples, Young, Quinlan, Broks, & Ellis, 2002). 
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snakes. Further research is thus needed to draw conclusions as to the existence of an 
encounter expectancy bias in healthy individuals. 
Anxious Individuals 
There is evidence that anxious individuals show pronounced distortions in 
expectancies. Butler and Mathews (1983) observed that patients with generalized anxiety 
disorder exhibited higher estimations of the likelihood that unpleasant events would 
occur than did nonanxious controls (i.e., off-line encounter expectancy bias). Conversely, 
no difference was found between individuals marked by high anxiety and those marked 
by low anxiety in their likelihood estimations for pleasant events.7 More research is 
needed, however, before definitive conclusions can be drawn. To the best of our 
knowledge, research on the consequences expectancy bias in anxiety is still lacking.  
Fearful and Phobic Individuals 
Expectancy biases are common in phobia. For instance, social phobics appear to 
overestimate the negative consequences of negative social events (Foa, Franklin, Perry, & 
Herbert, 1996; McManus, Clark, & Hackmann, 2000). Related effects have been 
observed in fears that are unrelated to social events.  
Mühlberger et al. (2006) showed pictures of spiders, flight accidents, and 
mushrooms to spider-phobic and flight-phobic participants. These pictures were followed 
by startling noises in some instances. Before the beginning of the experiment, participants 
with spider phobia and those with flight phobia reported an off-line a priori consequences 
 
7 This study was not published under the terms expectancy bias or covariation bias. Instead, the authors 
used the term judgmental bias. 
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expectancy bias for their respectively feared stimuli (see Amrhein et al., 2005, for 
comparable results for panic-prone individuals, as well as Kennedy et al., 1997, for 
comparable results for individuals characterized by high fear of spiders, of snakes, and of 
damaged or exposed electrical outlets). This a priori bias disappeared at the end of the 
experiment (no a posteriori covariation or memory bias; see also Amrhein et al., 2005).8 
Nevertheless, this initial bias disappeared much more slowly among those with spider 
phobia than among those with flight phobia, thus supporting the notion of the organism’s 
biological preparedness for phylogenetic threat stimuli (for similar evidence, see de Jong 
et al., 1995).9  Consistent with this finding, spider phobia, in contrast to flight phobia, 
was associated with enhanced skin conductance responses, magnitude of event-related 
brain potentials, and startle amplitudes, as reported by Mühlberger et al. (2006). 
Some studies have shown that fear level may vary as a positive function of the 
magnitude of the consequences expectancy bias (e.g., de Jong et al., 1995; Diamond et 
al., 1995; but see Amin & Lovibond, 1997, for counter-arguments). Furthermore, Muris, 
 
8 But see Kennedy et al. (1997) for surviving effects in individuals who are highly fearful of spiders, 
snakes, and damaged or exposed electrical outlets. The divergent results of these studies may be related to 
differences in task, population, and experiment duration. 
9 Other research shows that among  panic-prone individuals, the unlearning of illusory correlations between 
fear-relevant stimuli and aversive consequences can be accelerated by establishing high contingency 
between fear-irrelevant stimuli and aversive outcomes and low contingency between fear-relevant stimuli 
and aversive outcomes (e.g., by more frequently presenting fear-irrelevant stimulus–electric shock 
pairings than fear-relevant stimulus–electric shock pairings; Pauli, Montoya, & Martz, 2001). Such a 
procedure resembles the manipulations used in attention bias modification (ABM) procedures (see 
following section). 
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Huijding, Mayer, den Breejen, and Makkelie (2007) reported that fearful individuals, in 
addition to overestimating the negative consequences of the presentation of a feared 
animal, underestimated the likelihood of positive consequences (e.g., likelihood of 
obtaining candy). Hence, both the direction and the magnitude of bias should be 
explicitly addressed.  
Evidence further indicates that, apart from biased consequence expectancies, 
phobias are characterized by pronounced biases in encounter expectancies.10 Consistent 
off-line encounter expectancy biases have been reported for social phobia. Specifically, 
social phobics have been observed to overestimate the likelihood of being personally 
confronted with negative social events (Foa et al., 1996; Gilboa-Schechtman, Franklin, & 
Foa, 2000; Lucock & Salkovskis, 1988; possibly restricted to situations regarding 
personal performance: McManus et al., 2000), while underestimating the likelihood of 
being confronted with positive social events (Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2000; Lucock & 
Salkovskis, 1988). Off-line encounter expectancy biases have also been observed in 
agoraphobia (McNally & Foa, 1987) and acrophobia (Menzies & Clarke, 1995). 
Moreover, these biases were disorder-specific and did not extend to nondisorder-related 
areas (e.g., social versus nonsocial events in social phobia; Foa et al., 1996; Lucock & 
Salkovskis, 1988).  
Fear of spiders has also been associated with exaggerated on-line expectancies of 
encounters (e.g., spiders entering a room or spiders making physical contact; de Jong & 
Muris, 2002 [in spider-phobic children], or spiders appearing in a movie; Wik, 
Fredrikson, & Fischer, 1996). Moreover, we (Aue & Hoeppli, 2012) were able to show 
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that such exaggerated expectancies cannot be eliminated by giving objective background 
information, suggesting overall high or low probabilities of confrontations (for 
neuroimaging data suggesting reduced cognitive control being at the root of distorted 
encounter expectancies, see Aue et al., 2015). 
Notably, both types of expectancy bias diminished or even extinguished after 
effective treatment of social phobia (e.g., Foa et al., 1996; Lucock & Salkovskis, 1988; 
McManus et al., 2000). Patients in the Foa et al. (1996) study, for instance, underwent 
comprehensive cognitive-behavioral therapy for generalized social phobia. This therapy 
comprises exposure, cognitive restructuring, and social skills training. Lucock and 
Salkovskis (1988) used related techniques such as thought monitoring, reality testing, and 
activity scheduling, as well as challenging and looking for alternatives to negative 
automatic thoughts. To what degree each of these treatment components has been 
causally involved in the reduction of the expectancy biases remains to be determined. The 
development of specific cognitive bias modification (CBM) trainings, those that focus on 
individual expectancies, might be helpful in that respect. 
Interim Summary: Expectancy Bias 
Current research suggests the existence of diverse kinds of threat-related 
expectancy biases (on- and off-line consequences bias; on- and off-line encounter 
expectancy bias) among anxious, fearful, and phobic individuals (Table 1). The findings 
are surprisingly robust (across disorders, experimental manipulations, and measurement 
points). Therefore, biased expectancies may constitute a core characteristic of anxiety 
disorders. Yet, evidence for anxious individuals is sparse regarding biases both in 
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encounter and in consequences expectancies, and, to the best of our knowledge, 
subclinical populations have not yet been examined. 
Evidence among healthy individuals, in contrast, is mixed. No encounter 
expectancy bias was reported among these individuals, but an a priori bias for 
consequences may exist for threat emanating from evolutionarily salient stimuli such as 
snakes and spiders. Yet, biased expectancies are weaker in healthy individuals than in 
phobics and can be more readily overcome by refuting information. Because threat-
related encounter expectancy biases in healthy individuals have only rarely been studied, 
future research is needed before safe conclusions can be drawn.  
Review of Research on Attention Bias 
In contrast to biased expectancies, attentional biases have been extensively 
studied and therefore are only partially reviewed here. Table 2 provides a summary of the 
evidence regarding different attention biases in healthy, anxious, fearful, and phobic 
individuals. Figure 2 displays the most prominent paradigms used in examining attention 
biases in fear and anxiety.11 The specific cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying 
these biases are still being debated (for discussion, cf. Heeren, De Raedt, Koster, & 
Philippot, 2013). 
Healthy Individuals  
Some evidence exists for attention biases toward threat. For instance, nonfearful 
participants are characterized by greater facility in detecting a spider or a snake among 
 
11 An alternative way to measure attention biases is to assess eye movements via eye tracking (e.g., Aue, 
Hoeppli, Piguet, Sterpenich, & Vuilleumier, 2013). 
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mushrooms or flowers than vice versa. This facility may be due to biological 
preparedness for processing survival-relevant stimuli (Öhman et al., 2001; but see Lipp et 
al., 2004; Tipples et al., 2002). Attention bias toward threatening stimuli has also been 
demonstrated for other materials, including pictures of mutilated faces (Koster, Crombez, 
Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004), words related to physical or social threat (Mogg et al., 
1997), and angry faces (Brosch, Sander, Pourtois, & Scherer, 2008).  
Although these findings are suggestive, in a meta-analysis of 172 studies that used 
different paradigms, Bar-Haim et al. (2007) did not find evidence for an attention bias 
toward or away from threat in healthy individuals. Enhanced engagement of attention in 
threat was revealed only in blocked-design emotional Stroop task, which may rely on the 
accumulated exposure producing greater perceived threat. Such an interpretation is in line 
with evidence that nonanxious individuals show attention biases only when presented 
with high levels of threat (Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003).  
Nevertheless, the meta-analysis by Bar-Haim et al. (2007) relied solely on 
reaction time (RT) data related to the more traditional paradigms used in research on 
attention bias (see Figure 2). Other measures may be more sensitive to biases in healthy 
individuals.12 Our own (Aue, Hoeppli, et al., 2013) eye tracking and neurophysiological 
data suggest that emotional arousal may guide visual attention to potential threat sources, 
thus increasing vigilance to spiders even among nonfearful individuals. Such a 
mechanism may help healthy individuals actively cope with a threatening situation in 
order to downregulate emotional arousal.  
 
12 Note as well that visual search paradigms were not included in Bar-Haim et al.’s meta-analysis. 
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Anxious Individuals  
Whereas evidence for attention biases in healthy individuals is mixed, attention 
bias effects in anxious, fearful, and phobic individuals are more robust (Table 2; see also 
next section). In the earlier-mentioned meta-analysis, Bar-Haim et al. (2007) found a bias 
toward threat among anxious individuals. This effect persisted across paradigms, stimuli, 
populations, and exposure durations. In a recent literature review, Cisler and Koster 
(2010) concluded that anxious individuals exhibit facilitated attention engagement under 
threat, as well as difficulty in disengaging from threat, and attentional avoidance of threat 
(see also Fox et al., 2001, 2002; Richards, Benson, Donnelly, & Hadwin, 2014; for a 
critical review of current paradigms, see Clarke, MacLeod, & Guastella, 2013). Several 
studies further demonstrate the importance of considering the unfolding of attention over 
time, suggesting a vigilance-avoidance type of response to threat in anxious individuals 
(Ellenbogen & Schwartzman, 2009; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & 
Wiersema ,2006; Mercado, Carretie, Hinojosa, & Penacoba, 2009). 
CBM procedures have been rapidly developed in recent years.13 The main aim of 
developing these techniques is to examine the causal role of different processing biases in 
the maintenance of anxiety symptoms (see review in MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). In 
 
 
13 Here, we briefly summarize some of the main findings derived from works that use CBM paradigms. For 
CBM in children and adolescents, see detailed reviews in Bar-Haim, 2010; Beard, 2011; Browning, 
Holmes, & Harmer, 2010; Lowther & Newman, 2014; and MacLeod & Mathews, 2012. For meta-
analyses, refer to Hakamata et al., 2010; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Pergamin-Hight et al., 2015. See also 
Clarke, Notebaert, & MacLeod, 2014, who discuss null findings for CBM and suggest possible reasons. 
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attention bias modification (ABM) paradigms, individuals are trained to focus their 
attention on neutral rather than threatening stimuli. Numerous studies have shown the 
effectiveness of ABM procedures in correcting stable pathological, nonadaptive attention 
patterns in anxiety, with effect sizes similar to existing treatments (see meta-analysis of 
Pergamin-Hight, Naim, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn, & Bar-Haim, 2015). 
The overall success of CBM techniques supports the view that processing biases have a 
causal role in symptoms of anxiety.  
In line with the idea that deficits in attention control underlie changes following 
ABM, event-related potential findings suggest that ABM affects top-down attention 
control mechanisms, and not early attention-orienting mechanisms (Eldar & Bar-Haim, 
2010; Koster, Baert, Bockstaele, & De Raedt, 2010; for evidence regarding the neural 
pathways associated with ABM changes, see Browning, Holmes, Murphy, Goodwin, & 
Harmer, 2010; Clarke et al., 2014; Eldar & Bar-Haim, 2010).  
Fearful and Phobic Individuals  
Similar to anxious individuals, individuals with specific phobias exhibit biased 
attention toward their phobic stimuli, both regarding facilitated engagement and failure to 
disengage early attention from the threat (e.g., for social phobia, see Becker, Rinck, 
Margraf, & Roth, 2001; for spider and snake phobia, see Cisler, Ries, & Widner, 2007; 
Gerdes, Alpers, & Pauli, 2008; Lipp & Derakshan, 2005; Michalowski et al., 2009; Mogg 
& Bradley, 2006; Okon-Singer, Alyagon, Kofman, Tzelgov, & Henik, 2011; Pflugshaupt 
et al., 2005; Vrijsen, Fleurkens, Nieuwboer, & Rinck, 2009; Wik et al., 1993; see review 
in Okon-Singer, Lichtenstein-Vidne, & Cohen, 2013).  
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As in the case of anxiety, there is evidence for a vigilance-avoidance behavior 
pattern in phobia (e.g., Rinck & Becker, 2006). Recent eye tracking and 
neurophysiological data suggest that (a) the avoidance of phobic content among phobic 
individuals originates in heightened activity in the fear circuit; (b) in contrast to healthy 
individuals, these individuals engage in visual avoidance to downregulate fear; and (c) 
they use visual avoidance because they cannot successfully apply other regulation 
strategies (Aue, Hoeppli, et al., 2013).  
In two randomized controlled studies on generalized social phobia, ABM led to 
significant symptom reduction both after training and at 4 months follow-up (Amir et al., 
2009; Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, & Timpano, 2009). ABM with spider phobics, on the 
other hand, was associated with a temporary decrease in attention bias, but not with a 
greater reduction of symptoms (Reese, McNally, Najmi, & Amir, 2010). The latter 
findings may suggest that exposure to an ABM procedure alone is not sufficient to 
overcome strong and enduring symptoms of fear in specific phobia. Since multiple biases 
(e.g., in attention and in expectancies) coexist and interact, it is possible that changing 
pathological attentional processing solely is insufficient.  
Interim Summary: Attention Bias 
The body of research on attention bias in fear and in phobia points to enduring 
vigilance-avoidance patterns with respect to threat. Such patterns are difficult to modify 
and may result in severe disruption of everyday life. Evidence indicates that anxious, 
fearful, and phobic individuals show an initial facilitated attention bias toward threat, 
followed by difficulty in disengaging and later by avoidance during more controlled 
stimulus processing. These observations point to fundamental differences in the 
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distribution of attention in the face of threatening material among anxious, fearful, and 
phobic individuals compared with that among healthy individuals. ABM procedures have 
been developed to correct pathological attentional patterns in anxiety and phobia. 
Research Linking Biases in Expectancies and Attention 
To date, research on both healthy and pathological forms of fear has largely 
disregarded possible relations between expectancy and attention biases. We will start 
with some theoretical considerations about a link between diverse kinds of information-
processing biases in fear and anxiety. We will then describe some first studies 
investigating associations between distortions in expectancy and attention and discuss 
their implications. We will conclude this section with an additional consideration of other 
types of bias observed in fear and phobia, which may shed light on the mechanisms 
underlying expectancy-attention links. 
Theoretical Considerations 
Mathews et al. (1997) proposed that an automatic threat evaluative system affects 
an individual’s distribution of attention to threatening—often distracting—stimulations. 
The stronger an initial perceptual representation of an emotional distractor (in working 
memory), the harder and more effortful it should be to control and redirect attention 
toward nonthreatening cues. According to such a view, perceptual and memory processes 
have a strong impact on attentional processes in fear.14 Recent theoretical perspectives 
further developed the idea of such interdependencies between cognitive biases. 
 
14 Related to this idea, we (Arend, Henik, & Okon-Singer, 2015) recently reviewed lesion studies and 
suggested that emotional tagging may influence information processing via working memory mechanisms 
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According to the combined cognitive bias hypothesis (Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 
2006; see also J. M. G. Williams et al., 1997), cognitive biases (e.g., in attention, 
interpretation, and negative self-imagery) rarely act in isolation. Instead, they are 
supposed to be characterized by mutual influences on each other. In addition to these 
mutual influences, a given bias is hypothesized to be capable of moderating the impact of 
another bias on experienced fear. Uncovering such interplays between different biases 
could thus have ground-breaking consequences for the understanding of anxiety 
disorders. Although expectancy bias has so far been ignored in these considerations, this 
theoretical perspective can easily be extended to distortions in expectancies.  
In fact, models of visual detection consider prior expectancies and working 
memory representations to be causal factors implicating visual search (i.e., visual 
attention). For instance, attentional engagement theory (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989)  
postulates that attentional selection is modulated by templates that are actively 
maintained in memory (for highly similar hypotheses put forth by the guided search 
model, see Wolfe, 2003, 2010; Wolfe, Butcher, Lee, & Hyle, 2003; see also Kiyonaga, 
Egner, & Soto, 2012, regarding cognitive control over working memory biases related to 
selective attention, and Olivers, Peters, Houtkamp, & Roelfsema, 2011, for the conditions 
under which working memory content does or does not influence selective attention). 
These theories predict shifts of attention in case a sensory input matches a set of 
predefined properties. 
 
in healthy individuals. Similar mechanisms may lead to biased processing in anxiety, assuming abnormal 
initial evaluations of stimuli. 
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Applied to anxiety disorders, anxious individuals may, for instance, be predicted 
to expect situations that they consider risky as likely to occur and possibly to activate 
corresponding memory contents. These expectancy-triggered changes may, in 
consequence, increase vigilance toward threatening signals in the internal and external 
environments. Expectancy biases, then, may be the cause of observed biases in attention. 
On the other hand, the reverse influence is also imaginable, namely, that pathological 
attention to threatening information, possibly mediated by increases in threat-related 
cognitions (e.g., interpretations, memories), shapes biased expectancies. These examples 
show that the interplay between expectancy biases and other forms of bias in fear and 
phobia deserves greater consideration.  
Two reasons have led us to hypothesize a possible causal relationship between 
biases in attention and in expectancies. First, as stated earlier, these characteristic biases 
in fear and anxiety coexist. Second,  recent neurophysiological evidence shows that 
visual cortical areas involved in orienting of attention—areas that are known to show 
enhanced activation when attention is allocated to a certain stimulus (e.g., Vuilleumier, 
2005)—are also implicated in biased expectancies. For instance, Wik et al. (1996) found 
that reduced visual cortex activity in snake- or spider-phobic individuals was associated 
with increased encounter expectancies regarding the appearance of these animals in a 
neutral movie. The authors interpreted this reduced visual cortex activity as a sign of 
visual avoidance of the scene and thereby concluded it was a “neurophysiological 
correlate of avoidant anticipatory coping” (Wik et al., 1996, p. 267). Yet, because 
expectancies and brain activity were not directly related in this study, it remains unclear 
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whether reduced visual cortex activity really is a specific correlate of phobogenic 
expectancies or of other components of the fear response.  
To circumvent this problem, in another study, Aue et al. (2015) directly related 
brain activity to variations in on-line encounter expectancies. In line with the 
observations of Wik et al. (1996), we found reduced visual cortex activity to be 
characteristic of biased encounter expectancies for phobic threat. From the findings of 
these two studies, and the theoretical perspectives outlined at the outset of this section, 
we hypothesized common underlying mechanisms for biases in attention and biases in 
expectancies, as well as causal relations or mutual influences between the two.  
Studies Investigating Associations Between Expectancy and Attention Biases 
In two studies, we explicitly investigated the association of processes related to 
attention and expectancies in healthy and in phobic participants. The first study (Aue, 
Hoeppli, et al., 2013) revealed that eye gaze during controlled stimulus processing (as 
measured by eye tracking) strongly correlates with the encounter expectancy bias 
revealed by spider-phobic participants. The greater the visual avoidance the spider-
phobic individuals exhibited when confronted with spider pictures, the lower they rated 
their chances of encountering spiders. Thus, less attention toward spiders in spider phobia 
is associated with particularly low encounter expectancies. The reverse link was observed 
in participants who were not fearful of spiders. This pattern of response suggests that 
visual avoidance of spiders among spider phobics may act to downregulate encounter 
expectancies, thereby decreasing subjective fear. Nonfearful controls, in contrast, may be 
Processing biases in fear and anxiety  25 
able to better downregulate expectancies by paying particularly strong attention to 
them.15 
Because the data in this study were purely correlational in nature, however, we 
cannot conclude which process (expectancy, attention, or a third unknown process) 
caused the effect. In addition, whereas this study concentrated on avoidance mechanisms 
in visual attention, we were also interested in how expectancies relate to early attentional 
engagement. In a second study (Aue, Guex, Chauvigné, & Okon-Singer, 2013), therefore, 
we investigated the causal influence of expectancies on early engagement of attention. 
Specifically, we postulated that prior expectancies about the occurrence of threatening 
events would exert a top-down influence on the visual search for threat (i.e., attention 
engagement in threat-related targets) by the activation of corresponding working memory 
contents.16 Thus, we hypothesized the mechanism underlying expectancy influences on 
attention to consist of a mediating role of working memory processes (further 
considerations regarding memory-guided attention are presented in the following 
section), although memory content had not been explicitly registered in our study. 
Encounter expectancies were experimentally manipulated by preinforming 
participants about the likelihood that a deviant animal in a visual search array of nine 
 
15 These group-specific associations between eye gaze behavior and encounter expectancies were not 
unique to spiders, but generalized to other animals investigated. Hence, there may be substantially 
different coping styles in phobic versus nonfearful individuals, coping styles that are not specific to the 
treatment of phobic content. 
16 Alternatively, or in addition, such a top-down influence could be a result of motivational influences, such 
that highly fearful individuals expecting to encounter their feared animal are more strongly motivated to 
overcome or avoid the situation and thus are particularly vigilant. 
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animals would be a spider or a bird. Attention bias was measured by assessing the time a 
participant needed to indicate whether the deviant animal was a spider or a bird. Notably, 
in disagreement with our hypotheses, the results of this study suggest that external 
manipulations of individual expectancies do not influence initial attention engagement 
regarding biologically threatening stimuli such as spiders. Phobic participants showed a 
pronounced and persistent attention bias toward spiders, irrespective of previously 
presented expectancy cues. Moreover, expectancy cues did not influence RTs for spider 
detections in low-fearful (i.e., healthy) controls. 
By contrast, experimental manipulations of individual expectancies successfully 
modulated attention to nonthreatening stimuli (detection of birds), indicating that all 
participants paid attention to the expectancy cues and were able to profit from them in 
neutral situations (for further evidence of expectancy influences on attention engagement 
to neutral stimuli, see Burra & Kerzel, 2013). The expectancy-attention link that we 
observed for neutral targets, thus, conforms to models of visual detection (e.g., Duncan & 
Humphreys, 1989; Wolfe, 2003, 2010; for details, see previous section; see also 
considerations of Hutchinson & Turk-Browne, 2012, on memory-guided attention in the 
following section) that consider prior expectancies and working memory representations 
to be causal factors implicating visual search. Yet, these models cannot be applied to the 
spider stimuli included in our study.  
There was no effect of prior expectancies for spider targets, either in spider 
phobics or in low-fearful controls. One may tend to explain this lack of effect in phobics 
by the fact that phobic individuals display generally increased expectancies of 
encountering (i.e., being presented with images of) spiders (e.g., Aue & Hoeppli, 2012; 
Processing biases in fear and anxiety  27 
de Jong & Muris, 2002). The experimentally induced expectancies may have been too 
weak to counteract such habitual encounter expectancies, and so they were possibly 
unable to have an impact on the typically observed vigilance behavior for spiders in 
spider phobics. 
Our finding, however, that the RTs of low-fearful controls to spider targets also 
remained unaffected by the predicting cues is inconsistent with such an interpretation. 
This result cannot be explained by habitually increased encounter expectancies for 
spiders, because low-fearful individuals are usually characterized by a lack of an 
encounter expectancy bias. A more plausible interpretation of our findings, therefore, is 
related to biological preparedness theory. In line with this theory, our data may imply that 
evolution has led to the formation of attentional systems that are specific to the detection 
of phylogenetically salient stimuli such as spiders and are less penetrable to variations in 
expectancies than are systems used for the detection of nonthreatening stimuli. In 
contrast, as noted earlier, our data point to a relation between encounter expectancies and 
attention deployment in safe environments.   
Together, the findings of these two studies support the idea of an association 
between biases in attention and expectancies for threat, in which visual attention possibly 
has an impact on individual expectancies and not vice versa. Yet, it is also conceivable 
that expectancies, while not influencing early attention engagement, do influence later, 
typically more controlled, attentional processes, such as visual avoidance. Clearly, more 
research is needed to draw firm conclusions about the directionality of influences. The 
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role of memory processes and other cognitive factors as potential mediators also needs to 
be more directly addressed (see next section).17  
The interrelation between attentional- and expectancy-related processes may not 
be specific to anxiety (disorders), but rather may extend to other types of 
psychopathologies. For example, depression is characterized both by attention biases to 
negative information (e.g., B. P. Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997; Koster, De Raedt, 
Goeleven, Franck, & Crombez, 2005; Leyman, De Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2007) and 
by expectancy bias (Beck, 1976); recent models emphasize that negativity bias, defined 
as a predisposition towards hypersensitivity to stress and expecting negative outcomes, 
lies at the core of depression, influencing both feeling states and processing (Harmer et 
al., 2009; L. M. Williams et al., 2009). These considerations demonstrate that it might be 
worthwhile to link these alternative biases with expectancy and attention processes in fear 
and anxiety. 
Extending the Focus to Underlying Mechanisms and Other Information-Processing 
Biases 
From the studies reviewed earlier, we postulate a link between attention and 
expectancy bias, with attention bias causally influencing expectancies. While our data are 
suggestive, we need more research in order to determine causality and to gain better 
 
17 Of note, contrary to our own observations, research on pain in a healthy population (Boston & Sharpe, 
2005) describes an influence of threat expectancy on attention deployment in a secondary task. 
Surprisingly, though, expectancy of sensory pain decreased rather than increased attention for words related 
to sensory pain.  
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insight into the concrete mechanisms underlying the presumed transfer of one bias into 
the other. One way toward this aim consists in the simultaneous consideration of other 
biases that have been observed in fear and anxiety (e.g., memory bias, interpretation 
bias), thus incorporating all stages of information processing. 
Indeed, several studies to date suggest the importance of memory and 
interpretation particularities in attention and expectancy biases. Butler and Mathews 
(1983), for instance, suggested that the “detailed nature or vividness of an imaginal event 
may enhance its salience or accessibility in memory and, hence, increase the estimate of 
subjective risk” (p. 52). One way to increase the vividness of an event is by the 
attribution of attention. According to such a view, the influence of biases in attention on 
expectancies would be mediated by biases in memory.  
Whereas such complex mediation effects have not yet been examined, recent 
research demonstrates links between attention and memory bias among patients with 
social anxiety disorder and comorbid major depressive disorder (LeMoult & Joormann, 
2012). Furthermore, new findings propose that biased attention can cause memory biases 
for negative words among those socially anxious individuals who are characterized by 
comorbid depression (Blaut, Paulewicz, Szastok, Prochwicz, & Koster, 2013). In a 
similar vein, Vrijsen, van Oostrom, Isaac, Becker, and Speckens (2014) used principal 
components analysis to show coherence between attention and memory biases in 
formerly depressed individuals. Note, however, that there was no evidence for direct 
correlations between these biases (see also Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 
2004, for lack of relations between these biases). Equally important is that, while 
informative, these studies do not allow inferences about whether and how exactly these 
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cognitive biases affect each other, because different stimuli have been used in the tasks 
targeting attention and memory bias. 
It is also conceivable that memory exerts a causal influence on attentional 
processes, an idea that is expressed in the term memory-guided attention (e.g., 
Hutchinson & Turk-Browne, 2012; see Everaert, Fan, Koster, and Turke-Browne, 2014, 
for evidence of memory-guided attention in depression). The potential mechanisms by 
which memory content can influence attention deployment are manifold and refer to 
different memory systems. Hutchinson and Turk-Browne (2012) describe empirical 
evidence regarding memory-guided attention as being related to priming and associative 
learning, as well as working, episodic, or semantic memory. Without doubt, prior 
experience with a situation that has formed memory traces helps to direct attention 
toward relevant features in future situations that are alike. The role of expectancies in this 
translation is still to be determined. 
Although we did not find evidence for a causal influence of expectancies on 
attention to external threat (Aue, Guex, et al., 2013), expectancies may still be 
hypothesized to guide attention toward threatening internal information, such as 
internally generated cues related to past experience or interpretations. According to such 
a view, attention could function as a mediator of expectancy influences on memory 
access. On the other hand, it is also conceivable that memory serves as a source from 
which concrete expectancies are derived. That expectancy and memory processes may be 
related in fear and anxiety receives support from the observation of reduced positivity 
biases in memories and expectancies about the future in individuals who score high on 
the trait of worry compared with those who score low (Finnbogadóttir & Berntsen, 2013). 
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These complex thoughts demonstrate that bidirectional and mediating or moderating 
influences between fear-related biases in expectancies, attention, and memory are well 
imaginable. 
Furthermore, interpretation bias (e.g., Grey & Mathews, 2000; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2000; see also overview in Mathews & MacLeod, 2002) may be a precedent 
or a consequence of biases in attention, expectancies, and memory. It may also function 
as a mediator of the association among the other biases. Becker and Rinck (2004), for 
example, investigated whether fearfulness is really associated with greater sensitivity to 
harmful material, as suggested by the results of research on attention bias (see Frenkel, 
Lamy, Algom, & Bar-Haim, 2009, for highly similar research on emotional facial 
expressions and anxiety), or whether fearful and nonfearful individuals use different 
decision strategies related to differential interpretations of the same situation. In their 
investigation, the participants’ task was to decide whether pictures did or did not display 
spiders, beetles, and butterflies. The results of a signal detection analysis revealed 
comparable sensitivity to spiders among spider fearful and spider nonfearful participants. 
Yet, spider fearful individuals were characterized by a more liberal response criterion for 
spiders than were the nonfearful individuals, thus biasing their interpretation of the 
situation.18 This pattern of responses also held for beetles but not flowers, demonstrating 
only limited specificity of the described link between fearfulness and response criterion 
threshold.  
 
18 The study by Frenkel et al. (2009) showed, in addition, that anxious individuals are characterized by 
more conservative response criteria for happy facial expressions than are nonanxious controls. 
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These observations suggest that the reported effects on attention bias may be 
partly a result of interpretation differences between high- and low-fearful individuals. 
High fear and anxiety may correspond with a lower degree of tolerance for ambiguity or 
uncertainty (cf. Buhr & Dugas, 2006, Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006, and meta-
analytic data in Gentes & Ruscio, 2011, for a relation between intolerance for uncertainty 
and worry in different anxiety disorders; see Grenier, Barrette, & Landouceur, 2005, for 
similarities and differences between intolerance to uncertainty and intolerance to 
ambiguity). Thus, when anxious, fearful, and phobic individuals are in doubt, they may 
choose the threat interpretation in order to be prepared for the worst case, which is 
consistent with evidence for biased negative interpretation of ambiguous cues in fear and 
anxiety (e.g., MacLeod & Cohen, 1993). Indeed, it has been previously suggested that 
threat processing among fearful or anxious individuals is often rigid (automatic thoughts; 
see Beck et al., 1985) and dichotomous, with concurrent intolerance for uncertainty or 
ambiguity.19 Moreover, there is indication that anxiety-related interpretation bias may 
causally influence memory bias (e.g., Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 
1991). 
Furthermore, Hertel, Brozovich, Joormann, and Gotlib (2008) showed intimate 
links between interpretation and memory biases in generalized social phobia (see also 
Lundh & Ost, 1997), and Amir, Bomyea, and Beard (2010) reported that training socially 
 
19 An alternative way to interpret the results of Becker and Rinck (2004) is that highly fearful individuals 
are preoccupied with their feared objects and are therefore particularly prone to develop illusory 
correlations between certain stimulus classes (e.g., spiders) and aversive outcomes. These correlations 
then should be of direct relevance for biases in consequence expectancies.  
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anxious individuals with an interpretation modification program resulted in facilitated 
ability to disengage attention from threat. Even situational interpretations of unselected 
populations can be experimentally manipulated into the negative or positive direction by 
adequate training procedures, thus producing a corresponding bias in memory (Tran, 
Hertel, & Joormann, 2011).  
From the findings described in this section and observations that biases in 
attention, expectancy, memory, and interpretation coexist in anxiety disorders, we 
suggest that the mutual impacts of the different biases reinforce each other to form a 
vicious circle, thereby enhancing fear and anxiety behaviors (see Mathews & MacLeod, 
2002, for an overview of studies displaying a causal influence of attention and 
interpretation biases on emotional vulnerability [i.e., anxious symptoms]). Nevertheless, 
the exact pattern of causality has yet to be explored and should be the focus of future 
studies. The difference between pathological forms of fear and normal fear may lie in the 
fact that healthy individuals are able to break through this vicious circle at some point 
and/or adaptively regulate their fear. Alternatively, attention bias and expectancy bias 
may be linked in opposite directions (positive vs. negative association; see Aue, Hoeppli, 
et al., 2013, for supportive evidence) in these different populations. That expectancies 
may have an impact on attention differently in highly anxious and phobics versus 
controls would be in line with Mills, Grant, Judah, and White’s (2014) observation of a 
differential association of apprehensive anticipatory processing (in the form of repetitive 
negative thinking) and attention bias in high versus low socially anxious individuals.  
Some Future Directions 
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Future envisaged developments constitute an additional distinction between the 
different subtypes of the biases considered here (e.g., attention bias: early attention 
engagement, early attention disengagement, later attentional avoidance; expectancy bias: 
consequences, encounter; memory bias: encoding, consolidation, retrieval). As we 
outlined in the previous section, early attention biases in anxiety and phobia (e.g., 
facilitated initial engagement in threat) may conceivably have a causal impact on 
encounter and consequence expectancies. Yet, these expectancies may then have 
repercussive effects on subsequent attentional engagement. Biased expectancies may, for 
instance, provoke visual avoidance in order to downregulate subjective feelings of fear.  
Future investigations in the area may therefore be inspired by work on the 
combined cognitive biases hypotheses regarding depressed populations (Everaert, Duyck, 
& Koster, 2014). The author’s path analyses revealed (a) an influence of early selective 
orienting on interpretation bias, which itself was related to a memory bias, but also (b) an 
effect of maintenance of attention and interpretation on memory bias (see also Everaert, 
Tierens, Uzieblo, & Koster, 2013). These works highlight the importance of 
distinguishing between different attentional mechanisms (e.g., selection mechanism, as 
assessed here by frequency of fixation, and maintenance mechanism, measured here by 
duration of fixations).  
In general, questions addressing the link between different processing biases can 
be classified into three different categories: association, causal, and predictive magnitude 
(see Everaert, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012, for details). Some pioneering work now exists 
for the first two categories in research on attention-expectancy relations: An association 
between attention and expectancy biases has been demonstrated in fear of spiders, with 
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attention biases possibly causally influencing expectancies but not vice versa. It remains 
an open question, however, as to whether the simultaneous consideration of different 
biases increases predictive power regarding fear intensity. Furthermore, yet to be 
examined is whether effects corresponding to the different biases act simultaneously or in 
succession and whether they act additively or multiplicatively. Such investigations of 
different vulnerability factors (i.e., different information-processing biases) and the 
comprehension of their interplay may substantially advance our understanding of the 
origins and the maintenance of anxiety disorders.  
Finally, recent evidence highlights the role of motivation in processing biases. 
Vogt, De Houwer, and Crombez (2011) used a dot-probe task to demonstrate attention 
deployment to the location of cues associated with high value or high expectancy of 
success, compared with stimuli associated with low value or low expectancy of success. 
Even when contrasted with threat cues, attention was allocated to stimuli that were goal-
relevant (Vogt, De Houwer, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2013). Such effects were not 
limited to healthy individuals, but were found in anxious participants as well. Together, 
these findings highlight the effect of individual goals and associated (positive) 
expectancies on attention bias. In the future, motivational factors should therefore be 
considered as well. 
Conclusions and Outlook 
The evidence summarized in this article points to robust attention and expectancy 
biases among anxious, fearful, and phobic individuals. Recent studies point to an 
association between these biases, emphasizing the need for future examination of their 
shared neurocognitive mechanisms. Such research efforts are crucial for a better 
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understanding of processing biases in threatening situations and may have important 
theoretical and clinical implications. In future research, terminology—especially with 
respect to biased expectancies—should be unified to facilitate comparability of the results 
of different studies examining the causality of influences among different processing 
biases. Earlier findings (see, for instance, Mathews & MacLeod, 2002) demonstrated that 
at least attention and interpretation biases are somewhat malleable and can be changed 
quite easily in the desired direction via CBM procedures. The application of these 
procedures turns out to be an important and interesting venue for a test of an association 
between different processing biases because it allows for inferences regarding causality. 
Corresponding procedures for expectancy bias remain to be developed. Demonstration of 
a mutual influence among the different biases considered here could therefore lead to a 
breakthrough in the development of adequate and efficient treatments of anxiety 
disorders.  
In particular, future research should focus on the following issues: First, whether 
there actually are reliable associations between diverse types of information-processing 
biases in normal and pathological fear needs to be examined. If these links do indeed 
exist, a number of additional questions have to be addressed. Most important, causality 
has to be determined. Furthermore, the degree of specificity versus generalizability across 
different forms of fear/anxiety and different contexts of these links needs to be 
investigated. Moreover, the exact cognitive and biological (e.g., at the neural but also at 
the peripheral level) mechanisms at the basis of such links should be identified. The 
application of more sophisticated statistical models (e.g., Everaert, Duyck, & Koster, 
2014) could pay off here. Ideally, these investigations will also uncover simultaneous or 
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successive, as well as additive or multiplicative, effects of the different biases on 
experienced fear.  
From a clinical perspective, understanding the causal mechanisms at the basis of 
anxiety is crucial in order to develop effective therapeutic approaches. The identification 
of causal cognitive processes will enable therapists to address pathological fear and 
anxiety at its roots, which promises better treatment outcomes. Similar efforts have been 
conducted in the context of depression: For instance, self-reported negativity bias was 
related to more accurate detection of negative facial expressions (disgust and sadness), as 
well as to a greater tendency to interpret neutral facial expressions as angry (Watters & 
Williams, 2011). In addition, other works (Di Simplicio et al., 2014; Harmer et al., 2009) 
demonstrate that the common pharmacological treatments to depression, serotonin-
specific reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), modulate attention biases and change the balance 
from maladaptive enhanced orienting of attention to negative information to a more 
balanced orienting toward positive stimuli. This change is suggested to be mediated via 
prefrontal-limbic neural pathways, in line with numerous imaging studies showing that 
these pathways are associated with emotional processing and regulation (for reviews, see 
Iordan et al., 2013; Okon-Singer et al., 2015). Similar investigations in fear and anxiety 
have the potential to reveal the neural basis for maladaptive causal cognitive 
mechanisms, as suggested here. Follow-up clinical works may modulate these neural 
systems via cognitive training or neuro-focused techniques such as neurofeedback or 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS).  
Finally, neurophysiological evidence indicates that attention and expectancies 
closely interact in the appearance of positive cognitive biases such as optimism bias (also 
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called wishful thinking; Aue, Nusbaum, & Cacioppo, 2012). The degree of wishful 
thinking displayed by healthy participants varies as a positive function of the functional 
connectivity between the visual cortex and the human reward system. Because wishful 
thinking is actually a positive expectancy bias (defined as the tendency to overestimate 
the likelihood of positive future outcomes), the data support the notion that attention 
biases toward positive evidence—possibly driven by the human reward system—generate 
positive expectancy biases or vice versa. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether 
the links between attention and expectancy biases observed in the negative affect domain 
are valence-specific, or whether they are more general in nature and extend to the 
positive affect domain. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Typical expectancy bias paradigms in research on fear of spiders. 
(A) Differentiation between consequences expectancy bias and encounter expectancy 
bias. (B) Differentiation between off-line and on-line expectancy biases, as demonstrated 
along a time scale. 
Figure 2. Typical paradigms used to examine attention bias in the literature. Note 
that specific factors related to timing, order, and type of stimuli vary between studies. 
(A) On the emotional Stroop task, participants are asked to ignore the meaning of the 
word and respond according to the ink color. (B) On the dot-probe task, participants are 
required to report a target (here, for example, the orientation of two dots) that appears in a 
location previously occupied by an emotional or a neutral picture. (C) In the emotional 
modification of the spatial cuing paradigm, a target appears in a location previously cued 
by a neutral or an emotional item. (D) In emotional variations of the visual search task, 
participants search for an emotional target embedded among neutral distractors. 
Alternatively, a neutral target may be embedded among emotional distractors. Attention 
biases are typically assessed by comparing reaction time and accuracy between emotional 
and neutral conditions. Stimulus images courtesy of Michael J. Tarr, Center for the 
Neural Basis of Cognition and Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, 
http://www.tarrlab.org/ and http://www.shutterstock.com/ 
 
 
A Consequences expectancy bias: “What is the likelihood 
that the animal displayed will harm you/the presentation 
of the picture of the animal displayed will be followed by 
an electric shock?” 
Encounter expectancy bias: “ What is the likelihood that 
you will encounter the animal/that an image of the 
animal will be displayed?”
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